KURDWATCH, January 22, 2012—On January 14, 2012, the engineer Saʿid Fahd Deriki (b. 1970, married, three children) was arrested at his workplace for Syrian state television in Damascus. Deriki is accused of having secretly filmed a pro-Assad demonstration to show that there were far fewer participants than authorities had previously claimed.
KURDWATCH, January 13, 2012—On January 10, 2012, Ahmad ʿAbdullah Badro (b. 1971), Nidal ʿAbdullah Badro (b. 1967), and ʿAmar ʿAbdullah Badro (b. 1973, married, three children) were killed in al-Qamishli by armed members of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). PYD members had already attacked ʿAbdullah Badro, the father of those killed, at his home on January 8, 2012. He suffered severe bullet wounds. In the course of the attack, one of the attackers, Muhammad Mahmud, code name Khabad, a PYD member from al-Malikiyah (Dêrik) who, until recently, had fought for the PKK, was killed in the cross fire. Immediately after this incident, the police arrested ʿImad ʿAbdullah Badro, another of ʿAbdullah Badro’s sons. ʿAbdullah Badro is currently being treated at a hospital in al-Qamishli. A previously unknown group that calls itself »Protectors of the People´s Values« has taken responsibility for the murders of the brothers Ahmad, Nidal, and ʿAmar ʿAbdullah Badro. Their statement was broadcast on January 10, 2012 in Arabic by the PKK-friendly news agency Firat, as well as via the official PYD website. The murders are being justified by the death of Muhammad Mahmud, as well as by the seizure of PKK/PYD property. ʿAbdullah Badro was formerly a PKK member, and a villa in Damascus, in which PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan lived during his stay in Syria, is said to have been registered in Badro’s name. When Öcalan left Syria in 1998 under pressure from Turkey, ʿAbdullah Badro allegedly remained in possession of the villa. Even after he had turned his back on the PKK, he is said to have refused to return the villa, as he claimed that Öcalan had personally bequeathed it to him. In a statement on January 10, 2011, the Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekîtî) condemned the murders in al-Qamishli and described them as »despicable crimes«. The Yekîtî did not mention who was responsible for the murders. The Union of Kurdish Democratic Forces in Syria, the Avahi, a coalition of independent Kurdish youth groups, as well as the Union of the Coordinating Committees of Kurdish Youth in Syria have also condemned the murders. In a joint statement they held the »Shabiha« responsible for the acts. The term »Shabiha« refers to the regime’s irregular armed groups.
KURDWATCH, December 31, 2011—The purpose of this essay is to analyze the current landscape of Kurdish political parties in Syria, including their protagonists, their political goals, their concrete political actions, and their significance for society. Given the current situation, a political analysis of the Kurdish parties, which form a significant part of the Syrian opposition, is of considerable importance. [Read the report]
KURDWATCH, June 30, 2011—In reaction to the unrest ongoing since March 2011, President Bashar al-Assad issued multiple decrees on April 21, 2011. Decree 161 abolishes the state of emergency [download PDF]. Decree 53 dissolves the Supreme State Security Court [download PDF]. Decree 55 amends the code of criminal procedure [download PDF], and Decree 54 issues new guidelines to the right to demonstrate [download PDF]. The abolishment of the state of emergency, which has been in force since 1963, along with the dissolution of the Supreme State Security Court, is one of the core demands of the Syrian opposition. However, the adoption of these decrees has not led to an actual improvement of the human rights situation or to a strengthening of civil rights. In particular, the powers of the different intelligence services have not been curtailed in any practical way, as shown by their actions regarding the demonstrations critical of the regime. (See below for more on this matter.) Whether the courts responsible for political proceedings after the dissolution of the Supreme State Security Court will dispense more lenient sentences than their predecessor remains to be seen. The same is true of the question of whether the civil courts will rule very differently in political cases than the military tribunals did while the state of emergency was in effect. Decree 55 relegates the investigation of criminal cases pursuant to numerous articles of the penal code to the law enforcement authorities. Previously, the intelligence services were responsible for these kinds of investigations. Also listed are all of those articles that have been used to indict and sentence politically active Kurds in the past. If the decree were actually to be implemented, it would represent a noteworthy curtailment of the intelligence services’ authority to exercise power. Until now, there has been no evidence to indicate that the intelligence services will actually relinquish control over these investigations to the regular law enforcement agencies. Decree 54 is intended to regulate the right to »peaceful demonstration«. This goal has not yet been reached. Even though demonstrators have hardly used violence in the ongoing protests, thousands of protestors have been arrested and in many cases tortured, especially by the intelligence services. Additionally, according to reports of the opposition, up to 1,500 people have been killed. Numerous people in the Kurdish areas have also been charged due to their participation in unauthorized protests. Indeed, in contradiction to the provisions of Decree 54, the demonstrators have not been registering their rallies. Among the main demands of the demonstrators are the resignation of Bashar al-Assad and the Baath government. The leading role of the Baath party in state and society is, however, written into the constitution. Since, according to Article 3 of the Decree, demonstrations are not permitted to infringe on the principles of the constitution, demonstrations which demand an end to Baath dominance or which criticize the privileged position of the Baath party are thus not able to be approved. The demand for the resignation of al-Assad would fall under Article 374 of the penal code (defamation of the President) and would thus infringe on prevailing laws in a similar fashion. The problem is located less in the wording of Decree 54 than in the accompanying legislation. This also applies when it reads, that in addition to individual citizens, properly authorized parties, mass organizations, trade unions, and NGO’s have the right to register demonstrations. In Syria there are almost no independent NGO’s; legal parties, mass organizations, and trade unions are government organizations.
KURDWATCH, June 21, 2011—Kurdish and Arab representatives of al-Hasakah province gave President Bashar al-Assad a list of demands regarding the province on April 5, 2011. The total of 34 demands pertains mainly to specific economic and agricultural problems and issues. Genuinely political demands are rare, although one of the few exceptions is the naturalization of the unregistered stateless, maktumin. Considering this, the demands are strikingly different from those made by the predominantly young demonstrators in al-Qamishli and other cities in the province. Over the past weeks, these demonstrators have demanded a fundamental democratization of Syria. The demands are interesting in that they highlight the various forms of economic discrimination to which the inhabitants of al-Hasakah province, both Kurds and Arabs, are subject. Worthy of note is the underdevelopment of the region’s infrastructure. The demands point to the fact that products grown in the region cannot be processed there. The necessary infrastructure – mills, canning factories, oil and gas refineries – does not exist and building permits are not being issued. Moreover, the demands make clear that al-Hasakah has a poorer position relative to other provinces. For example, while the owners of agricultural land generally receive deeds of ownership, this is not the case in al-Hasakah. While agricultural opportunities make al-Hasakah a potentially rich region, these problems along with years of drought have resulted in an overall precarious economic situation. The paper was, among others, signed by:
Hamid Sulayman, representative of the Shaykhan-Kiki tribes Samir al-Basha, representative of the Kojari tribes Muhammad Khallu, representative of the Mersinan tribes Mahmud al-Basha, representative of the Milli tribes ʿIsa Saʿdun, representative of the Milli tribes Muslih Shukri Daqori, representative of the Daqori tribes Ahmad Daham al-Hadi, shaykh of the Shammar tribe ʿAbdulʿaziz Muhammad al-Mislit, shaykh of al-Jiburi tribe Hilu al-Hilu, shaykh of al-ʿUdwan tribe Nuri at-Tallaʿ, shaykh of al-Baqqarah tribe Muhammad ʿAbdurrazzaq at-Taʾi, shaykh of the Tayʾ tribe Shaykh Husayn al-Hajji, leader of the Bani Sabʿah tribe Shaykh ʿAbdulkarim Salih al-ʿUbaydu, representative of the Harb tribe Bashar Daham, shaykh of ash-Sharabin tribe ʿIsa Sulayman Hajj Saʿdun, leader of the Bahdinan tribe Mor Eustathius Matta Roham, Syriac-Orthodox archbishop of Jazirah and the Euphrates ʿAbdurrahman al-ʿAbdullah, mufti of al-Hasakah province Ghazi Ibrahim Muhammad Ibrahim al-Basha, lawyer ʿAbdullah Fatimi Yunus Hajj Ahmad Yunus Khidr Muhammad Ahmad Hajj Mansur Ahmad ad-Darbas
The complete list of demands can be downloaded as a PDF. [Download PDF]
KURDWATCH, May 14, 2011—Three demonstrators, Abdulsamad ʿUmar, Saʿid Muhammad Muhammad and Matin Ahmad Murad, were released from custody on bail. Charges were filed pursuant to Article 335 of the Criminal Code. [More information on the case]
KURDWATCH, March 31, 2011—KURDWATCH is releasing five protocols of interrogations that members of various Syrian intelligence services conducted with members of Yekîtiya Star, the women’s organization of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as well as with a sympathizer of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In contrast to previous cases, KURDWATCH has made these documents anonymous in order to protect those interrogated from being stigmatized as traitors. During the interrogations they disclosed—almost certainly under torture—at times detailed information about party structures and other party activists. The protocols offer insight into the structures of the PYD/PKK, as well as the Syrian state’s policies towards this organization. For example, the protocols confirm that, contrary to what many activists have claimed, the PYD and PKK are identical. The PYD is the Syrian branch of the PKK. The imprisoned female activists all worked for Yekîtiya Star, the women’s organization of the PYD, and, according to research by KURDWATCH, their convictions in Syria were the result of this work. At the same time, the activists mention in the interrogations that they were trained in the camps of the PKK, made propaganda for the PKK, and explained the »teachings« of Abdullah Öcalan to other women. Moreover it becomes clear that the PKK still commands a considerable network of supporters and sympathizers in Syria. The protocols refer not only to the multitude of people who have been recruited in Syria since the 1980s, but also mention the numerous allies who to this day house supporters of the PKK or assist them by other means. The number of female activists mentioned in the protocols alone may be higher than the entire number of women active in other Syrian-Kurdish parties. All of this points to the fact that the PKK continues to enjoy considerable acceptance within the Syrian-Kurdish population. This acceptance, Syria’s cooperative relations with Turkey in recent years, as well as the fact that the PKK is a tightly run cadre organization with armed fighters at its disposal explain why the Syrian state has taken such harsh action against the PKK. This policy began at the end of the 1990s with Abdullah Öcalan’s expulsion from Syrian and Lebanon—prior to this the PKK was able to train fighters there relatively unhindered—and is reflected in the high rates of arrests, convictions, and incidences of torture of PYD activists as compared to other Syrian-Kurdish parties. However it should be noted that there may be additional explanations for the multitude of human rights violations against PYD/PKK sympathizers. If, for example, the PKK does in fact have more sympathizers in Syria than any other party, this might also explain why there is a higher rate of arrest and torture among PYD supporters. Despite the repressions described above, the PKK still enjoys a certain sphere of influence in Syria. Aside from an incident in early 2011 in which several PKK members were allegedly shot by the Syrian military at the Iraq-Syrian border, PKK supporters continue to illegally cross the Syrian border relatively unchallenged. This is confirmed by the protocols, in which activists describe their countless border crossings and mention how dozens of newly recruited PKK members are smuggled across the border together. It is clear that the Syrian intelligence services are aware of this border traffic. It remains open to what extent this »accommodation« rests on individual financial interests and structures that have developed or whether it shows acquiescence on the part of the state. Ultimately the protocols show that membership in an armed cadre organization like the PKK means the loss of all personal autonomy. The cadres have no influence over where they will be sent or what tasks they will be assigned to perform. They are bound to the leadership in all aspects of their lives; without permission from the command, not even contact with parents or necessary medical treatment is possible. [Download PDF]
KURDWATCH, December 31, 2010—Syria is considered one of the few Muslim states in the Middle East in which religious minorities—especially the various Christian groups—possess extensive rights. In fact Article 35 of the Syrian constitution guarantees religious freedom, as long as the practice of religion does not disturb the public order. Restrictions exist insofar as the president must be of Muslim faith and Islamic law remains a significant source of legislative power (Article 3). But does this religious freedom also apply to the Yazidi minority? Or does the Syrian state persecute Yazidi on the basis of their faith? Can Yazidi live their faith in public? What is the relationship between the Muslim majority and the Yazidi minority? Following a brief introduction on the basics of the Yazidi faith and remarks on the Yazidi settlement areas in Syria, this report will attempt to answer these and similar questions. [Download PDF]
KURDWATCH, December 8, 2010—On June 20, 2010, the single military judge in al-Qamishli sentenced Walat und Salahuddin ʾAyyub Muhammad to six months imprisonment each, pursuant to Article 307 of the Criminal Code. Due to mitigating circumstances, the sentence was reduced to four months. The charge pursuant to Article 288 of the Criminal Code was dropped on the basis of Presidential Decree No. 22, dated February 24, 2010 [Further information on the case]. The individuals convicted are charged not only with the possession of (party) publications in the Kurdish language but also with making notes on these publications. The verdict makes clear that the possession of books or papers that express opinions that differ from those of the government – in this case regarding the events in al-Qamishli in 2004 – can lead to prison sentences, even if these opinions are in no way made public. As the verdict itself states, the punishment is intended to deter potential copycats. [Download verdict]
KURDWATCH, September 16, 2010—On January 17, 2010 the single military judge in al‑Qamishli sentenced Muhammad Schaykhu ʿIsa, Khalil ʾIbrahim Muhammad, ʿAbdussalam Schaykhmus Mahmud, and Rami Schaikhmus al‑Hasan to six months imprisonment each for »inciting sectarian strife« as a result of their participation in a minute of silence. The minute of silence was intended to honor the victims of the poison gas attack on Halabja. A translation of the verdict is now available as a PDF download. [Download PDF]
KURDWATCH, July 31, 2010—On September 10, 2008, the Syrian president issued Decree 49. The decree amended Statute 41 of October 26, 2004, which regulated the ownership, sale and lease of land in border regions. In Kurdish and pro-Kurdish circles, the decree was almost unanimously described as »anti-Kurdish«. [Download report]
KURDWATCH, July 3, 2010—As with the list of expatriate persons from al‑Qahtaniyah (Tirbesipî) wanted by the State Security Service, the list from al‑Qamishli has also been extended. The following names were added: Mihemed Salih Ibrahîm Usman, Mihemed Selîm Mele Hisên, Silêman Selîbê. [Further information on the case]
May 16, 2010 – On September 10, 2008, the Syrian President issued Decree 49. The decree amended Statute 41, dated October 26, 2004, which regulated the ownership, lease, and sale of land in border regions. KurdWatch has published Statute 41, as well as a new, improved translation of Decree 49. Only through a direct comparison of the two documents does it become clear where the exceptional severity of Decree 49 lies. Additionally, KurdWatch will soon publish a background report on the consequences of Decree 49. [Download PDF]
April 28, 2010 – On November 15, 2009, the Second Criminal Court in Damascus sentenced Mistefa Cumaa Bekir, Mihemed Seîd Hisên el-Umer and Seedun Mehmud Şêxo, leading members of the Kurdish Freedom Party in Syria (Azadî), to three years imprisonment each pursuant to Article 285 of the Criminal Code and to six months imprisonment each pursuant to Article 307 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore all of their civil rights were revoked. The penalties were combined and the more severe penalty is to be carried out. On January 10, 2009, Mistefa Cumaa Bekir was detained in the Farʿ Filastin prison, a branch of the Military Intelligence Service in Damascus. His fellow party members, Mihemed Seîd Hisên el-Umer and Seedun Mehmud Şêxo, were arrested on October 26, 2008 in Rumailan and Raʾs al-ʿAin (Serê Kaniyê) respectively. [Download PDF]
April 14, 2010 – With Decree No. 93 on August 23, 1962, the Syrian government ordered a special census for al-Hasakah province, which was carried out on October 5, 1962. As a result, approximately 120,000 Kurds lost their Syrian citizenship and with it, their basic civil rights. [Download PDF]
February 3, 2010 – On January 26, 2010, the Supreme State Security Court in Damascus postponed the decision indefinitely in the case of five Kurdish politicians. On January 29, 2007, Nezmî Ebdilhenan Mihemed (b. 1960), married, four children, Ehmed Xelîl Derwîş (b. 1972), married, three children, Yaşa Xalid Qadir (b. 1973), married, two children, Dilgeş Şemo Memo (b. 1982), married, and Tehsîn Xeyrî Memo (b. 1980), married, one child, all members of the Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekîtî), were arrested by members of the Military Intelligence Service in the apartment of Yaşa Xalid Qadir in Aleppo. The above-named individuals had taken part in a seminar there. After two months of pre-trial custody in Aleppo and Damascus, their case was transferred to the Supreme State Security Court in Damascus. They were brought to the Saydnaya prison, thirty kilometers north of Damascus. When the families of the detainees were allowed for the first time to visit their relatives in prison six months ago, they learned that Tehsîn Xeyrî Memo had been brought to an unknown location a year ago. His whereabouts and the state of his health are unknown. During its session on January 26, 2010, the Supreme State Security Court decided to treat Tehsîn Xeyrî Memo’s case separately from that of the other four party members.
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